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FREEDOM TO PAY OR FREEDOM
TO CHOOSE?
PRIVATE CONTRACTING AND
MEDICARE BENEFICIARIES
Marilyn Moont
LIKE MANY OTHER ISSUES BEING DEBATED about
the Medicare program, private contracting evokes both adamant
supporters and opponents. Essentially, private contracting is an
agreement between a physician and a Medicare beneficiary where
the patient agrees not to submit a claim to Medicare, but agrees to
pay privately for the medical service. This allows physicians to
bypass the strict rules that govern how much they can be paid for
providing services to Medicare beneficiaries. Not surprisingly, this
option has been strongly supported by many physician groups.
In this Article, I examine the issue from the perspective of
beneficiaries and the Medicare program as a whole. Does private
contracting constitute good public policy? Is there a legitimate
problem facing beneficiaries or the program as a whole that this
policy would address? What other goals might be used to justify
abrogating physician autonomy? How would the economic incen-
tives established by such a rule work in practice? These questions
are likely to engender a different answer from a beneficiary's per-
spective than one might get if looking at it from the point of view
of providers of services.
Before examining the specifics of private contracting, it is
important to put the discussion into the context of the history of
the Medicare program and of broader changes taking place in the
delivery of care. The analysis that concludes the Article examines
the tradeoffs in the context of economic theory.
t The Author is a Senior Fellow at the Urban Institute in Washington, D.C.
The Urban Institute studies social and economic issues in America and analyzes pos-
sible solutions.
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I. A BRIEF HISTORY TO SET THE CONTEXT
When Medicare came into being in 1966, a chief concern was
that there would be an unwillingness by many physicians and other
practitioners to participate in this government program. The
American Medical Association (AMA) and other groups had
strongly opposed a universal insurance program for persons aged
sixty-five and over, fearing considerable governmental control
over the practice of medicine. In fact, there had been calls in some
quarters for a national boycott of Medicare.1 To alleviate such
fears, the initial legislation for Medicare sought to reassure physi-
cians by exercising almost no control over payments. Medicare
was to serve as a conduit for payment, compensating physicians
for eighty percent of usual and customary charges using the same
methodology of many private insurance plans. Physicians were
allowed to bill patients for amounts in excess of their twenty per-
cent co-payment requirement. 2 These additional amounts were re-
ferred to as "balance billing," meaning that physicians were
charging patients for the balance between Medicare's 100% al-
lowed charge and the actual bill. Physicians could choose to accept
"assignment" -- that is, they would treat the 100% allowed charge
as payment in full and seek no amount from beneficiaries above
their twenty percent co-payment. In practice, Medicare proved to
be a very good deal for physicians,3 and nearly all of them treated
Medicare patients.
By the early 1980s, however, interest in cost containment
grew as the costs of health care in general had grown rapidly since
the late 1970s. Pressures on the Medicare program were particu-
larly great, reflecting both an interest in limiting public spending
in general as well as a concern about the costs of health care. Ef-
forts to hold the line on payments for all types of Medicare serv-
ices dominated legislation on the program in the 1980s. Physician
fees were a target both because they constituted a large share of
Medicare spending and because in the late 1970s and early 1980s,
1 See generally Medicare Caution Given Physicians: AMA Finds Antitrust Risk
in a Concerted Boycott, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 12, 1965, at 15 (discussing the AMA's
announcement that its doctors could individually refuse to accept Medicare patients,
and the possible antitrust implications of such an action).
2 See generally ROBERT J. MYERS, MEDICARE 144-53 (1970) (explaining how
physicians are reimbursed under supplementary medical insurance).
3 See, e.g., id. at 244 (discussing a study which indicated that in all but four
percent of the cases, the reasonable charge equaled the charge made by the physi-
cian).
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these payments were growing at rates averaging about twenty per-
cent each year. Thus, in 1984, payments to physicians were frozen
to achieve short run savings and presumably to set the stage for
longer-term reform.4 To try to keep balance billing reasonable
while fees were frozen, the 1984 legislation also included provi-
sions to discourage balance billing.5 This reflected an attempt to
prevent physicians from merely shifting costs onto beneficiaries.
By the end of the 1980s, physician payment reform was fi-
nally adopted after a considerable amount of controversy. Even
though the reforms enacted were meant to be budget neutral and
not change overall spending on physician services, the goal of the
new fee schedule goal was to alter relative prices substantially --
raising payments for primary care physicians relative to specialists
and altering longstanding geographic differences in payment lev-
els. As a consequence, there was concern that without further con-
trols on balance billing, physicians would simply use that mecha-
nism to offset these changes and undo the adjustments in payment
levels that were the goal of the legislation. Although the earlier
restrictions on balance billing were still in place, they were widely
regarded as obscure and difficult to enforce. The new system ulti-
mately established a firm upper boundary on how much physicians
could be paid for specific services, even when they chose not to
accept assignment. As a result, balance billing is now limited to
fifteen percent above Medicare's allowable rates. 6
What did all these legislative changes mean to Medicare bene-
ficiaries? Initially about sixty percent of all bills subject to the
twenty percent coinsurance amount were assigned.7 During the
early 1980s, that share fell to a little over fifty percent.8 When the
1984 legislation was put in place, assignment rates began to in-
crease, reaching seventy-seven percent in 1988 and ninety-seven
4 See generally PHYsIcIAN PAYMENT REv. COMM'N, ANNUAL REPORT TO CONG.
23-24, 134 (1988) (discussing trends in health care expenditures in the Medicare
program as a context for considering changes in physician payment policy).
5 See id. at 134-36 (describing changes in Medicare's policy on assignment and
balance billing).
6 See PHYSiCiAN PAYMENT REv. COMM'N, ANNUAL REPORT TO CONG. 15-17
(1992) (discussing reform efforts in the payment of physicians).
7 See Soc. SEC. ADMIN., ANN. STAT. Stpp. TO Soc. SEC. BULL. 334 (1995).
8 See OFFICE OF STRATEGIC PLANNING, U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERv.,
HEALTH CARE FINANCING REv. 110 (Stat. Supp. 1998) (discussing Medicare physi-
cian and supplier assignment rates by state).
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percent in 1996. 9 Most physicians now find it in their interest to
simply take Medicare's fee schedule as payment in full.
The most important impact has thus been to reduce substan-
tialy the amount of cost sharing that beneficiaries must do to re-
ceive physician and other related services. In 1977, balance billing
constituted 17.9% of cost sharing liability under Part B of the pro-
gram.' 0 That proportion rose to 23.2% in 1981.11 After 1986, the
share of liability from balance billing declined steadily to 2.2% of
Part B cost sharing in 1996.12 Thus, most beneficiaries now face
little or no balance billing, resulting in cost sharing liabilities that
are much less than they might have been without the controls.
These reductions in balance billing liabilities came at a time
when other cost sharing liabilities were growing rapidly in Medi-
care. Use of all services has risen as has the level of payments,
which generally affects the coinsurance amounts required for each
service. For example, between 1977 and 1996, total cost sharing
liabilities for beneficiaries rose 356% as compared to a decline of
eighty-eight percent in balance billing liabilities. 13 If balance bill-
ing had remained at a thirty percent share of Part B cost sharing
through 1996, beneficiary liabilities would have risen by 512%
instead.
Because the combination of relatively low increases in pay-
ments to physicians over the past two decades and the limitations
on balance billing, policy makers have periodically expressed con-
cerns about whether beneficiaries are or soon will face problems in
finding physicians and other service providers willing to serve
them at the prices that Medicare will agree to pay. Consequently,
the Physician Payment Review Commission (PPRC) and other
groups have periodically attempted to poll beneficiaries regarding
access to physicians. Surveys by the PPRC have found that physi-
cians overwhelmingly participate in the Medicare program."4 Well
9 See id. at310.
10 See id. at 199.
1 See id.
12 See id.
13 Id. at 198.
14 See MEDICARE PAYMENT ADVISORY COMM'N, REPORT To CONG.: CONTEXT
FOR A CHANGING MEDICARE PROGRAM 136 (1998) (citing Carol-Ann Emmons, Sur-
vey of Physicians About the Medicare Program and Fee Schedule: A Study Con-
ducted for the Physician Payment Review Commission by the National Opinion Re-
search Center (1994)). See also Jennifer O'Sullivan & Cecilia 0. Echeverria, Medi-
care: Private Contracts, in CONG. RESEARCH SERV. REP. FOR CONG. 2 (last modified
Oct. 21, 1997) <http://www.senate.gov/govl-dpclcrslreportslpdf/97-944.pdf> (citing
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over ninety percent of all physicians (excluding areas such as pe-
diatrics where few beneficiaries would be treated in any case) take
Medicare patients, and many of them continue to accept new
Medicare patients as well.15 The problems of access that the PPRC
survey found relate more to shortages of physicians within a geo-
graphic area than to Medicare policy per se. As yet, there is little
evidence that the tight limits on how much physicians can be paid
for services performed on Medicare beneficiaries has led to any
decline in access to such services. 6 Thus, from the perspective of
most beneficiaries, the policy of limiting balance billing has been
highly successful because it has reduced what their out-of-pocket
(or insurance premium) costs otherwise would have been without
restricting their choices of providers.
While Medicare's payment levels have tended to be below
those paid by the private sector,17 the gap does not seem to have
widened over time, largely because private insurers, particularly
managed care organizations, have become more restrictive in their
payments as well. In fact, Medicare's rates as a share of private
rates increased from sixty-six percent in 1994 to seventy-one per-
cent in 1996.1 This likely helps to explain why access has not
been a concern.
But if Medicare has not worsened relative to other private
plan payments, why has the concern about private contracting been
raised? While the rules under which Medicare now operates are
also generally consistent with private insurance plans that also
seek discounts from participating providers, there is one important
exception. Medicare limits what beneficiaries who "go out of net-
work" for care can be charged by their physicians. In many private
plans, the amount that the plan will pay is also limited and less
generous than for "in network" providers, but the ultimate amount
that the patient pays the doctor is not under the control of the pri-
a report of the Physician Payment Review Commission claiming that in 1997, eighty
percent of physicians serving Medicare beneficiaries were "participating" physi-
cians).
15 See MEDICARE PAYMENT ADVISORY COMM'N, supra note 14.
16 See generally id. at 127-37 (discussing the PPRC's analysis of the Medicare
Current Beneficiary survey, a longitudinal survey of Medicare beneficiaries admin-
istered by HCFA in 1996).
17 See Diana K. Verrilli & Stephen Zuckerman Preferred Provider Organiza-
tions and Physician Fees, HIEALT CARE FIN. Rv., Spring 1996, at 161, 162 (refer-
ring to findings by the Physician Payment Review Commission suggesting that
Medicare fees were thirty to forty percent below private fees during the 1990s).18 See MEDICARE PAYMENT ADVISORY COMM'N, supra note 14, at 126.
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vate plan. In this way, Medicare uniquely sets an upper boundary
on what any physician may charge a Medicare beneficiary for a
covered service. This is essentially the source of much of the criti-
cism concerning payment policy.
At least in theory, before 1997 the only way that physicians
could be totally free of such controls was not to treat Medicare pa-
tients. The only way that the Health Care Financing Administra-
tion (HCFA) that runs the Medicare program would know if pa-
tients are now making private arrangements to pay physicians
more would be if a patient complained. There is some anecdotal
evidence of physicians requiring waivers of patients to pay more
than Medicare would allow before they would provide treatment.
This may be the Medicare version of a "don't ask, don't tell" pol-
icy. But in response to Stewart v. Sullivan, 19 a court case that left
considerable confusion on what the rules were on private con-
tracting, the Health Care Financing Administration attempted to
strengthen its prohibition against private contracting first through
instructions in its Carriers' Manual and then through a technical
amendment in 1994 indicating that balance billing limits applied to
all persons enrolled in Part B and not just those submitting bills.20
These efforts were intended to prevent physicians from asking pa-
tients to sign waivers concerning payment limits.
H. VERSIONS OF PRIVATE CONTRACTING
LEGISLATION
The legislation proposed and enacted on private contracting
has stirred up a considerable amount of controversy, and both pro-
ponents and opponents have sought further clarifications on how
physicians may deal with Medicare patients. Much of the recent
legislative activity began as a floor amendment by Senator Jon Kyl
to the 1997 Balanced Budget Act (BBA) legislation. The amend-
ment specified that nothing in Medicare law could prohibit a phy-
sician, or another health care professional from entering into a pri-
vate contract with a Medicare beneficiary for services for which no
claim would be submitted. Furthermore, "[t]he provision was in-
"9 816 F. Supp. 281 (D.N.J. 1992) (holding that plaintiffs' claims were not ripe
because plaintiffs had not established that the Department of Health and Human
Services had articulated a policy on private contracting).
20 See O'Sullivan & Echeverrfa, supra note 14, at 2-3 (discussing the history of
Medicare and private contracting).
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tended to apply only to physicians who were outside of Medicare
entirely. 2 1
The conference committee changed this amendment. The ver-
sion of private contracting enacted in the Balanced Budget Act of
1997 contained a number of restrictions on private contracting --
attempting to limit such activities. Physicians wishing to engage in
private contracting would have to agree not to bill Medicare for
any services for any of their patients for a two-year period.22 That
is, they would have to explicitly opt out of Medicare for a period
of time. Not only did this piece of the BBA not satisfy those who
pushed for the Kyl version of private contracting, but it brought on
scathing criticism accusing the BBA of making the situation
worse. Thus, there was not even agreement on whether the BBA
loosened the restrictions that HCFA believed were in place or
whether it made explicit a prohibition that some physicians argued
should not apply.
As a consequence, Senator Kyl introduced legislation to
modify the BBA, establishing a substantially more flexible set of
rules for private contracting even as compared to his initial
amendment.23 This legislation would have allowed individuals to
enter into private contracts with their physicians under certain
conditions. The contract would relate only to Medicare-covered
services, would have to be drawn up in advance of receiving serv-
ices, and would have to indicate what specific services would be
subject to the contract. Presumably this could be done on a serv-
ice-by-service basis so that a physician could, for example, iden-
tify a specific procedure that he or she would perform only on a
private contract basis. Thus far, this legislation has not been en-
acted, but it is likely to be an issue again in the future.
The level of discourse on this issue has been highly charged
and both sides have made exaggerated claims although they often
have at least some basis in reality. Opponents of the BBA ap-
proach went so far as to argue that it would prevent beneficiaries
from receiving services not covered by Medicare because doctors
21 Id. at 4.
22 CCH EDIToRIAL STAFF PUBuCATION, 1997 MEDIcARE AND MEDIcAID
LEGISLATION: LAW AND EXPLANATION 719-21, at 156-57 (1997).
23 See S. 1194, 105th Cong. § 1 (1997) (proposing an amendment to the Social
Security Act which would clarify the right of Medicare beneficiaries to enter into
contracts with physicians and other health care professionals for health care services
for which no payment was sought from Medicare).
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would be subject to the new rules for all health care services.2 4
These claims continued despite specific assurances by the head of
the Health Care Financing Administration that runs the Medicare
program that Medicare requirements do not apply to such addi-
tional services?2 For those services covered by Medicare, the 1997
BBA statute effectively allows physicians who have decided not to
participate in Medicare to enter into private contracts -- the origi-
nal problem that Kyl sought to address. It does, however, restrict
behavior of physicians who wish to set their own prices either by
service or for specific patients while still participating in Medi-
care.
Opponents of any form of private contracting, including that
in the BBA, argued that loosening restrictions on physicians con-
tracting with patients for higher payments was just the first step
toward allowing doctors to balance bill at will for all Medicare-
covered services. Although relaxation of balance billing was not
part of the proposed Kyl legislation, opponents feared that it would
be followed by a second round later in which physician groups
would be able to attract beneficiary support for having Medicare
pay their share regardless of contracting arrangements. If so, pri-
vate contracting would expand substantially once beneficiaries no
longer would have to pay the full costs of care. But perhaps the
most important claim that needs to be sorted out relates to the title
of Senator Kyl's 1997 bill: "Medicare Beneficiary Freedom to
Contract Act of 1997." Prohibitions on private contracting do limit
physician flexibility, but do they help or harm beneficiaries?
1Il. WHAT ARE THE RELEVANT POLICY ISSUES?
The key question concerning this legislation is whether it en-
hances the choice and freedom of beneficiaries, the rights of phy-
sicians to charge for services, or both. The arguments cast the is-
sue of private contracting in a very different light depending upon
what we assume is the nature of the protection and who is being
protected.
24 See Letter from Sandra Butler, President, United Seniors Ass'n, to Senior
Americanis] (Fall 1997) (on file with Health Matrix).
25 See Private Contracting in Medicare: Hearing Before the Senate Finance
Committee, 105th Cong. (1998) (statement of Nancy-Ann Min Deparle, Administra-
tor, Health Care Financing Administration) available in LEXIS, CIS Congressional
Universe Library, Federal Document Clearing House Congressional Testimony File
(clarifying that Medicare patients can use their own funds to pay for services that
Medicare does not cover).
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A. Physicians' Concerns
The most straightforward argument is that private contracting
would aid physicians, allowing them to determine what to charge
which patients. Private contracting, particularly on a service-by-
service basis, would allow physicians to key in on specific pay-
ments that they believe are too low and establish higher charges
for those services. While many physicians could not afford to drop
out of Medicare entirely, they might be willing to risk losing some
patients on a more selective basis. For example, in cases where a
patient receives most of his care from a particular physician, would
he go elsewhere to obtain one particular service for which the phy-
sician requires a private payment? Physicians would retain consid-
erable leverage if they used private contracting selectively.
Another argument often used by physicians is that they should
be able to charge more from patients with high incomes. Why, the
argument goes, should wealthy patients get these discounts? Maiiy
physicians have argued that, as a consequence, they would have
more resources in that case to devote to treating patients who do
not have substantial resources. The problem is that when balance
billing was largely uncontrolled, there was only mixed evidence
that doctors attempted to distinguish between who could afford
services and who could not.26 Physicians may have a tendency to
treat all patients alike. Further, doctors in midtown Manhattan with
well-heeled patients are not likely to also treat low-income patients
from elsewhere in New York City.
The best argument for private contracting is assuring the free-
dom of physicians to charge for services. Even proponents of bal-
ance billing limits often acknowledge that the current Medicare
structure does not allow for highly skilled, outstanding physicians
to obtain the higher fees that they would be able to command in a
free market. Medicare's fee schedule and balancing billing limits
do put substantial barriers in the way of such freedoms for physi-
cians.
The actual impact of private contracting on physicians de-
pends upon whether they are able to engage in "price discrimina-
tion." In economic theory, this term refers to the ability of suppli-
ers to set different prices for different customers, charging each
what they are willing to pay. Economic theory indicates that sup-
26 See PHYsIcIAN PAYMENT REv. COMM'N, supra note 4, at 146 (discussing fac-
tors that may be involved in physician decisions to accept or reject assignments).
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pliers who are able to price discriminate effectively among their
customers can achieve higher profits. That is, in the present con-
text, physicians would charge consumers who are willing to pay
more a higher price, and charge those who will only purchase that
good or service at a lower price that lower amount. This allows
sellers to reap the advantages of high volume, while still charging
higher prices to some. Without price discrimination, the only way
to sell the higher volume is to lower the price for everyone. In a
purely competitive market, price discrimination is not possible as
buyers would seek other suppliers willing to offer services at the
market price. Thus, it is usually only when the sellers have an ad-
vantage in the market (such as a reputation for high quality care or
as the sole provider of such services) that they can price discrimi-
nate.
B. The Beneficiary's Perspective
Next consider the more complicated question of what private
contracting means for beneficiaries. Supporters make the claim
that such legislation will open up new horizons for Medicare bene-
ficiaries, giving them access to doctors who now refuse to partici-
pate in the Medicare program. Senator Kyl has argued that:
Under current law, seniors do not enjoy the same rights as
the rest of us. If Congress fails to correct this inequity, I
fear we will have established a pernicious principle: that
when it comes to health care, senior citizens have only one
option -- a government program -- no matter what their de-
sire or their ability to pay for care outside of Medicare.27
Private contracting is thus characterized as a choice issue, and the
argument is that Medicare beneficiaries cannot go to doctors of
their choice even if they are willing to pay.
Such a prohibition on private contracting does restrict the
ability of beneficiaries to compensate physicians at a higher level,
but does it really restrict choice? First, consider the two types of
physicians affected by private contracting. The BBA already ad-
dresses the issue of allowing beneficiaries to contract with those
physicians who do not participate at all in Medicare. The changes
that Senator Kyl proposes would allow more flexible contracting
27 Jon Kyl, Give Seniors Same Health Care Choice as Other Americans, Kyl
Tells Panel, Feb. 26, 1998, Press Release (announcing Senator Kyl's testimony be-
fore the Senate Finance Committee).
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whereby physicians could do this for only part of their practice. If
that causes some physicians who now take no Medicare patients to
accept such patients for at least some services, then beneficiaries
might have access to a few additional doctors. Since very few
doctors now decline to treat Medicare patients, however, this is
likely to be only a limited advantage.
But physicians now in Medicare who dislike the level of some
of their fees or who decide to set fees higher for some patients (if
the Kyl legislation passed) would effectively restrict beneficiary
access for those who lack the ability to pay the higher charges. For
example, if a physician decides to raise his fees for a particular
procedure beyond the level that Medicare allows, some patients
may be unable to afford that rate and have to change doctors when
they need a particular procedure. It is difficult to characterize such
an effect as an expanded choice. It is also questionable whether
those who would sign contracts would do so voluntarily or would
feel coerced into doing so.
The current system of placing an upper boundary on the
amount that beneficiaries must pay for particular services through
the fee schedule and balance billing limits makes the cost of care
more affordable for beneficiaries. From that perspective, it also
protects their ability to exercise choice in the selection of physi-
cians.
Whether choice expands or contracts for beneficiaries in ac-
tual practice depends upon the relative size of the two competing
effects. How many physicians who now decline to treat any Medi-
care patients will accept them under private contracting as com-
pared to the numbers of physicians who will use private contract-
ing to accept only patients with greater financial resources who
can pay privately? As described above, most doctors already par-
ticipate in the Medicare program. On the other hand, there are a
large number of studies that indicate that affordability is a barrier
to individuals getting care. To the extent that private contracting
would reduce the affordability of physician services, that could
have a major impact on which physicians patients could afford to
see and even how often they might be able to afford to go. The
stringent limits on private contracting in the 1997 BBA were spe-
cifically designed to discourage physicians from opting for these
arrangements. If private contracting were expanded to allow serv-
ice-by-service contracts, more beneficiaries would likely be disad-
vantaged by this policy. And if the policy did ultimately lead to a
relaxation of balance billing limits, then we might see a return to a
2000]
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large portion of physician services being billed at higher-than-
Medicare rates. Despite gains in incomes since the Medicare pro-
gram began, there are still a large number of beneficiaries with
incomes of less than 200% of poverty.28 The number of persons
adversely affected by the inability to afford services if private
contracting were expanded would likely be greater than the num-
ber of persons able to access doctors who now are not available to
them.
What about the quality of the doctors who choose not to par-
ticipate in Medicare? Is it the best doctors who find they can do
without Medicare patients? Here there is little evidence although
proponents of private contracting argue strongly that this is an is-
sue. If these doctors now totally drop out of the Medicare program,
the current BBA version of private contracting is probably suffi-
cient to meet their needs since they are unlikely to want to selec-
tively contract with beneficiaries. In a more flexible, partial private
contracting environment, doctors most likely to be able to price
discriminate -- that is, charge at least some of the patients substan-
tially higher fees -- are those who have a competitive advantage,
either because of their reputations or the lack of other physicians
with similar specialties in a given location. Ironically, quality
might become more of an issue from the relaxation of private con-
tracting because of this market power. Thus, instead of helping to
give patients access to high quality care, this policy could contrib-
ute to the creation of a two-tiered Medicare program, differentiated
by the ability to pay.
A second way in which access to care might be affected is the
time that a physician spends with patients. If payment levels are
too low, would physicians respond by cutting the time spent with
each patient? Would higher payment levels lead to better care?
Again, there is little evidence that this is a problem in fee-for-
service Medicare. Complaints in this area are more likely to be
associated with those who participate in some form of managed
care, both Medicare beneficiaries and others.
C. The Federal Government's Role
Another key player in this discussion is the federal govern-
ment, both as a payer of bills and as an overseer of the public in-
28 See NAT'L ACADEMY ON AN AGING SOCIErY, DEMOGRAPHY Is NOT DESTINY
32 (1999) (discussing the distribution of the elderly by income relative to the poverty
level for 1975 and 1997).
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terest. As a payer, the federal government has an interest in limit-
ing its own obligations. Allowing more flexibility in what physi-
cians can charge may indirectly allow the government to pay less.
Physicians who believe they can shift any unpaid balance onto
beneficiaries are less likely to hold the federal government ac-
countable for higher fee schedules. But as the responsible party for
assuring enrollees that they receive all the benefits to which they
are entitled, the federal government might be concerned about the
prospects of turning Medicare into a two-tiered system in which
only wealthier beneficiaries can afford the best, or at least the
highest priced, physicians.
IV. BALANCING BENEFICIARY PROTECTIONS
AGAINST PHYSICIANS' FREEDOM
While supporters of private contracting have implied that both
physicians and beneficiaries stand to gain from the Kyl legislation,
it is more likely that, in practice, these two groups are pitted
against each other. On balance, beneficiaries are likely to face less
choice and higher costs from more flexible private contracting,
while physicians would likely gain. So how should the interests of
these two competing groups be reconciled?
Allowing more flexibility might result in higher quality phy-
sicians getting higher fees. They would presumably be able to de-
mand and receive such higher payments. But this assumes that
beneficiaries are well-informed about the quality of physicians and
have the ability to make those distinctions. Private contracting may
not be the best way to achieve the goal of rewarding quality. Other
remedies addressing this issue might be more appropriate. For ex-
ample, Medicare could establish higher payment levels for out-
standing physicians based on a set of objective criteria. The Ad-
ministration's summer 1999 proposal for Medicare reforms in-
cludes plans to reward centers of excellence and to establish a pre-
ferred provider arrangement. These principles, in theory, could be
extended to physician fee schedules as well, recognizing quality
differences. 29
The potential advantages of allowing price discrimination by
physicians need to be weighed against the disadvantages this cre-
ates for beneficiaries. When price discrimination occurs for goods
and services that have alternatives or are considered less essential
29 DoMEsTic POL'Y CouNciL & NAT'L ECON. COuNcIL, THE PRESIDENT's PLAN
TO MODERNIZE AND STRENGTHEN MEDICARE FOR ThE 21sT CENTURY 1-7 (1999).
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than health care, few objections are usually raised. Unlike the case
of a standardized good or service, however, the ability to price dis-
criminate for physicians' services may allow physicians to deny
care to some individuals, and/or to effectively offer different prod-
ucts to different patients, for example, time spent with the patient.
The sensitive nature of health care and the argument that it de-
serves a special set of protections are claims often made to justify
seeking equal treatment for all Medicare beneficiaries. The sub-
stantial variation in the ability of beneficiaries to pay for services
suggests that changing these rules will result in a decline in equal
treatment. Governmental intervention is justified when markets
fail to serve the public good. Historically, the justification for the
Medicare program was the need to assure consistently high quality
care to elderly and disabled persons. Thus, the essential tradeoff is
between the freedom of physicians to charge what the market will
bear and a Medicare program that treats beneficiaries consistently
regardless of ability to pay.
